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Introduction 
The infamous Great Leap Famine in 1959 to 1962 is the worst famine in modern Chinese 
history. The catastrophic famine caused gigantic causalities, estimated from 23 million to 46 
million people.1 A professor from Hong Kong University of Science and technology, James Kai-
sing Kung and a professor from Peking University, Justin Yifu Lin, argues that political 
radicalism created the Great Leap Famine.2 Ineffective policies were carried out – grain 
procurement and steel and iron production – while government officials focused on protecting 
their careers by enforcing unrealistic goals which starved peasants to death.3 
Amartya Sen, a Nobel Laureate argues, “in the terrible history of famines in the world, no 
substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively 
free press.”4 According to Sen, severe famine does not happen if a country is autonomous 
(independent), fair and accountable (democratic), and encourages free exchange of ideas (free 
press). Autonomous government has the power to allocate resources according to domestic 
concerns, and democratic government has duty to accommodate societal concerns guided by the 
rule of law. Relatively free press allows citizens to express their concerns freely and notifies 
government with challenges in society.   
The Great Leap Famine in China could also have been prevented if China at the time was 
independent, democratic, with a relatively free press, as Sen suggested. The Great Leap Famine 
was led by three key factors: Mao ignoring precautionary alarm suggested by the political elites; 
Mao silencing intellectuals from suggesting alternative agricultural-scientific theories; and top 
                                                     
1 Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe 1958-62 (New York: 
Walker & Company, 2010), 324, 333. 
2 James Kai-sing Kung and Justin Yifu Lin, “The Causes of China’s Great Leap Famine, 1959-1961,” Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 52, no.1 (2003): 67. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” Journal of Democracy 10, no.3 (1999): 3-17.  
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leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were not informed about the villagers dying of 
famine. These could have been prevented under the Sen’s conditions because democratic 
institutionalization allows political elites to freely discuss policies, freedom of expression 
encourages intellectuals to freely criticize scientific theories, and democratic election and mass 
media coverage motivates citizens to freely address their concerns. In addition to Sen’s 
argument, authoritarian government can also prevent substantial famine if the government is 
autonomous, fair, accountable, and encourages free exchange of ideas such as China today. 
What is the Great Leap Famine? 
The casualties of the Great Leap Famine vary among scholars. Most of the estimates 
were based on the 1984 Statistical Yearbook by the National Statistical Bureau, which provides 
official figures on population, birth and death rates between 1950 to 1982.7 Peng Xizhi estimated 
23 million, Judith Banister reached 30 million, Cao Shuji suggested 32.5million, Yang Jisheng 
concluded 36 million, and Jung Chang proposed 38 million.8 However, a renowned historian 
Frank Dikötter proposes at least 45 million causalities because population numbers in 1984 
Statistical Yearbook is inflated. He argues that since 1964, overall population was systematically 
inflated by more than one percent or in some counties as high as 2.2 percent because local cadres 
wanted to receive greater rations and other goods.9  
The severity of the famine is reflected upon testimonials from the survivors. Yu Wenhai, 
a production team account in Huaibin County’s Fanghu Township, describes as follows: 
 
                                                     
7 Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe 1958-62 (New York: 
Walker & Company, 2010), 324. 
8 Ibid, 325. 
9 Ibid, 333. 
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It was not unusual for people to eat corpses. I myself did so at Yaozhuang. I had gone to 
see the production team head Yao Denju, and in the production team office I smelled the 
fragrance of cooked meat… Gao Hongwen of the Gaozhuang production team had three 
children. When he went to build the railway at Guangminggang, his wife cooked up all three 
children and ate them.10 
 
The Great Famine was a consequence of the CCP’s socialist campaign Great Leap 
Forward which lasted from 1958 to 1962. The Great Leap Forward was proposed to transform 
China’s agrarian society into industrial and socialist society. The state abolished private property, 
and citizens were encouraged to join communes where they collectively worked together to 
produce agricultural output. Farmers kept minimal crops based on their family size while 
majority of productions went to the state who used these agricultural products to fund industrial 
sectors.11 In just three years of the movement, investment on industrial sectors doubled from 14.4 
billion yuan in 1957 to 38.9 billion yuan in 1960.12 As a consequence, major relocation of people 
from rural areas to the cities occurred, and by 1960, urban state-workers reached 31.24 million 
out of 50.44 million state-workers in total.13 
This rapid transition from agriculture to industry significantly damaged the Chinese 
economy. People in the cities suffered from high inflation, and industries could not pay workers 
                                                     
10 Jisheng Yang, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; 2012), 
41 
11 Sue Williams, “A Century of Revolution. Part II: The Mao Years (1949-76),” Directed by Sue Williams (New 
York: Zeitgest Films, 1994). 
12 Nicholas R. Lardy, "The Chinese economy under stress, 1958–1965,” in The  
People's Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949–1965, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar and John 
K. Fairbank (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 38-87. 
13 Ibid, 368. 
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due to increased labor cost.14 Meanwhile, people in the countryside suffered from reduced labor 
but with higher demands in food productions to accommodate urban population.15 Although 
collectivization and rapid urbanization may have played a role in the famine, more problematic 
was that the state remained unresponsive to the society in need during this radical change. The 
Great Leap Famine occurred because the dictatorial leader ignored alarms from his political 
elites, promoted inappropriate agricultural policies without challenging scientific theories, and 
leaders of the CCP was not informed about suffering citizens.  
Mao ignores Political Elites 
 Mao ignored political elites who tried to fix the early failures of the Great Leap Famine 
through severe persecution. During the early stages of the Great Leap Forward, the CCP political 
elites tried to fix the ineffective state policy. After one year of policy implementation, many 
provincial cadres started to dismantle the communal system because of its unproductivity.16 
People lacked incentives to work hard in communes because everyone was paid equally 
disregarding the effort they put in.17 In order to motivate workers, provincial party leaders 
introduced household contracting system that allowed each workers take extra output if they 
produced more than contracted amount.18 However, the gradual shift from unproductive 
communes into motivating household contracting system was put to an end after the Lushan 
Conference.  
                                                     
14 Sue Williams, “A Century of Revolution. Part II: The Mao Years (1949-76),” Directed by Sue Williams (New 
York: Zeitgest Films, 1994). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Dali L.Yang, Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap 
Famine (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 48-49. 
17 Ibid, 50. 
18 Ibid, 49. 
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A British journalist, Jasper Becker, argues that the Lushan Conference was the best 
chance to stop Mao and its ineffective policies.19 In July and August of 1959, Lushan mountain 
at Jiangxi province, the CCP elites gathered to discuss the Great Leap Forward. During this 
meeting, Defence Minister Peng Dehwai wrote a “letter of opinion,” handwritten with 10,000 
characters, to Mao. The mood of Peng’s letter is depicted in the verse from Beijing Opera:  
 
The millet is scattered over the ground. 
The leaves of the sweet potato are withered. 
The young and old have gone to smelt iron. 
To harvest the grain there are children and old women. 
How shall we get through the next year? 
I shall agitate and speak out on behalf of the people.20 
 
Peng advised Mao for systematic and sober assessment of the Great Leap Forward because the 
Leap created conflicts between worker-peasant relationships and urban-rural developments.21 
Peng further contended that the CCP, which had won their power with the sacrifices of peasants, 
must be responsible for famine.22 Although Peng addressed genuine concern for the welfare of 
Chinese people, dictatorial Mao was unwilling to listen to his friend’s advice. Mao argued that 
the suffering is “nothing but the tuition fees that must be paid to gain experience…come back in 
ten years and see whether we were correct.”24 Consequently, Mao branded Peng and Peng’s 
                                                     
19 Jasper Becker, Hungry Ghosts: China’s Secret Famine (London: John Murray, 1996), 87. 
20 Ibid, 88. 
21 Dali L.Yang, Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap 
Famine (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 51. 
22 Jasper Becker, Hungry Ghosts: China’s Secret Famine (London: John Murray, 1996), 88. 
24 Ibid, 89. 
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supporters as “right opportunists,” and began severe persecution.25 Mao’s persecution of Peng 
who was his closest friend and hero of the Korean War, silenced other political elites from 
further questioning Mao. Also, Mao was unwilling to accept different ideas from political elites 
who advocated for household contracting system, which could have alleviated famine, and began 
collective punishment with Peng.26 Inevitably, the household contracting system was suppressed 
and commune system became more strictly enforced. Due to Mao’s unwillingness to listen to 
political elites, China lost its chance to reverse the failing policy and silenced political elites from 
challenging bad policies, which ultimately resulted in the Great Famine. 
Mao promotes false Scientific theory 
 In prior to launching the Great Leap Forward, Mao persecuted many intellectuals and as a 
result, unproductive scientific theories intensified the famine. In 1956, the CCP encouraged 
citizens to express concerns during the Hundred Flowers Campaign. However, Mao shortly 
reversed his stance because citizens were questioning the legitimacy of the single party 
dictatorship. Between 1957 to 1959, the CCP led Anti-Rightist Movement to persecute 
intellectuals who criticized against the government, and by 1958, three hundred thousand citizens 
were labeled as “Rightist.”27 When the CCP launched the Great Leap Forward in 1958, 
intellectuals were in fear of criticizing government policies. As a result, the unproductive 
scientific theories Mao implemented were left unchallenged and contributed to the Great Leap 
Famine. Three key scientific myths that played significant role in the Great Leap Famine were 
close-planting, excessive use of fertilizer and backyard furnaces. 
                                                     
25 Dali L.Yang, Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap 
Famine (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 52. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Qian Gang and David Bandurski, “Uneasy silences punctuate 60th anniversary coverage,” China Media Project, 
10 Sept. 2009, http://cmp.hku.hk/2009/09/10/1740/, accessed 28 Oct. 2016. 
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Firstly, Mao promoted close planting based on the idea from a Soviet agronomist Trofim 
Lysenko.28 Lysenko hypothesized that seeds of same class do not compete with each other if they 
were densely planted, therefore, increasing overall productivity.29 However, his hypothesis 
proved to be false for same family crops compete each other for growth.30 Increased competition 
created inferior crops which decreased their grain production and enlarged their leaves for better 
photosynthesis.31 Secondly, the use of excessive fertilizer was implemented because the increase 
in green crops production level in 1957 coincided with the increase in fertilization rate.32 
However, when used excessively, fertilizer decreased overall production because once past the 
threshold, it dries out the leaves and even causes plants to die which is referred to as a fertilizer 
burn.33 Thirdly, Mao believed installing furnaces in the backyard of every commune will allow 
production of high quality steel out of scrap metal.34 However, the steels produced in backyard 
furnaces were of low-quality that could not be used in industrial sectors. It only depleted 
resources and tired out labor force without producing any valuable output. If intellectuals were 
not persecuted, hence challenging Mao from implementing unproductive scientific theories, the 
Great Leap Forward could not have been as catastrophic as it had been. 
Mao uninformed of Village concerns 
                                                     
28 Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe 1958-62 (New York: 
Walker & Company, 2010), 39. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Bunny Guiness, “Correct plant spacing for a fabulous border,” Telegraph, 30 Nov. 2009, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/gardening/6692693/Correct-plant-spacing-for-a-fabulous-border.html, accessed 1 Nov. 
2016. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Chung-kuo, Nung-pao, “The Fertilizer Work Over the Past Decade,” Extracts from China Mainland Magazines, 
no.187 (Oct. 2, 1959), 23. 
33 Susan Jones, “Fertilizer Burn,” American Orchid Society 2008, http://www.aos.org/orchids/orchid-pests-
diseases/fertilizer-burn.aspx, accessed 1 Nov. 2016. 
34 Zhi-Sui Li, The Private Life of Chairman Mao: the memoirs of Mao’s personal physician (New York: Random 
House, 1994), 272-274, 278. 
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 During the Great Leap Famine, the villagers who were dying of famine could not address 
their concerns to the leaders of the CCP because local officials silenced village petitions. The 
CCP has been top-down unitary system where orders are passed down from top to bottom of the 
system. However, the concerns from the bottom had to surpass many layers before reaching to 
the top.35 When citizens addressed their concerns to local officials, these petitions were easily 
diverted before escalating to senior officials.36 Also, when citizens petitioned directly to Beijing 
through petition department, regional concerns were sent back to regional officers.37 These 
structures combined with restricted freedom of press, limited citizens to address severity of 
famine to the top political leaders of the CCP.  
 The lack of communication between the state and the society further resulted in 
exploiting the villagers. Under the pressure from their superiors to produce higher agricultural 
output, the regional officials inflated agricultural production. Instead of actual 5 tons, local 
officials reported 10 tons, and local officials used false reports to calculate the amount of state’s 
and peasants’ share in agricultural output.39 The consequence of false reporting was paid by the 
peasants whose agricultural output was mostly taken by the state leaving lessor for themselves. 
When peasants repelled against the predatory state, they were punished with violence. According 
to Frank Dikötter, local cadres beat up local villagers, buried alive, thrown into pounds, forced to 
labor in the middle of winter, and etc.40 Around six to eight percent of those who died during the 
                                                     
35 Sue Williams, “A Century of Revolution. Part II: The Mao Years (1949-76),” Directed by Sue Williams (New 
York: Zeitgest Films, 1994). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Laura M. Luehrmann, “Facing Citizen Complaints in China, 1951-1996,” Asian Survey 43, no.5 (2003): 852. 
39 Basil Ashton, Kenneth Hill, Alan Piazza and Robin Zeitz, “Famine in China, 1958-61,” Population and 
Development Review 10, no.4 (1984): 621-622. 
40 Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe 1958-62 (New York: 
Walker & Company, 2010), 294-96. 
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Great Leap Famine were tortured to death in regional level.41 The vicious cycle of state 
exploiting peasants persisted because peasants could not address their concerns to anybody other 
than the abusers, under the unitary system without relatively free press. 
Amartya Sen and the Great Leap Famine 
 As Sen describes, if China at the time was independent and democratic, and had 
relatively free press, the Great Leap Famine could have been prevented. The state would have 
been more responsive to concerns from political elites, ideas from scientists, and concerns from 
citizens. Both political elites and leaders could have freely discussed about the cost and benefits 
of the policies and collectively come up with the best state policy. Also, unproductive scientific 
theories would have been challenged by other intellectuals, preventing them from harming the 
economy, and replaced by efficient theories. Furthermore, village concerns would have been 
addressed to the political leaders through elections and mass media coverage. 
    First, if Sen’s conditions were met, Mao would not have been able to ignore political 
elites who tried to reverse famine. Leaders in democracies are more responsive toward 
alternative ideas because power is not centralized in one leader. The governmental power is 
dispersed through institutionalization in judiciary, legislative, executive bodies where each body 
check performances of one another. During the Great Leap Famine, Mao would not have been 
able to persecute all the political elites who objected his policies because democratic 
institutionalization limits leader’s power. Also, opposition party can freely question the leader’s 
performance in democracies. If China were democratic, General Peng’s letter of opinion would 
not have been ignored, and provincial party cadres would have been rewarded for increasing 
                                                     
41 Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe 1958-62 (New York: 
Walker & Company, 2010), xiii. 
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production output through household contracting system. Overall, Sen’s statement correctly 
describes the Great Leap Famine because democratic institutionalization limits leaders’ power 
and political opposition have freedom to object the leader which together could have prevented 
China from the severe famine. 
 Second, if Sen’s conditions were met, the false and unproductive scientific theories 
implemented by the CCP could have been challenged and prevented from causing famine. 
Intellectuals in democracies are encouraged to openly debate over theories and their ideas are 
shared through relatively free press. This open discussion is critical in science because scientific 
theories are falsifiable. During the Great Leap Famine, scientific myths such as close planting, 
excess fertilizer usage, and steel production at backyard furnaces could have been prevented if 
these theories were open to discussion. The scientists could have been freely tested and debated 
over practicalities of suggested theories. And based on the proposed solutions, the government, 
could have used these ideas to fix false assumptions and implement most efficient scientific 
strategies. Overall, Sen correctly describes the Great Leap Famine because democracy with 
relatively free press would have encouraged intellectuals to openly discuss about the scientific 
theories. Eventually these ideas could advise the state with most efficient strategies, while 
preventing from having unproductive scientific theories which intensified famine. 
 Third, if Sen’s conditions were met, the villagers could have addressed severity of the 
famine directly to the political leaders. In democracies, the state officials carry-out policies based 
on the popular consensus and citizens have the power to elect state representatives who can 
reflect their interest. Also, having relatively free press allows both citizens and the state to 
acquire accurate information about the realities of each other and share concerns mutually. 
During the Great Leap Famine, villagers would have been able to express their concerns to the 
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CCP leaders through mass media, and local officials wouldn’t have reported the inflated figures 
nor been able to beat the citizens to death. If democratic, citizens would have voting power as 
their leverage against the authority, and local officials would have been responsive to citizens’ 
concern rather than trying to satisfy senior officials through inflated figures. Furthermore, 
newspapers could have written about failures of the Great Leap Famine and reported about local 
officials committing violence to village farmers. Overall, Sen is correct in a sense that if China 
was democratic with relatively free press, citizens would have been able to express their 
concerns through election and press while the government would have been motivated to 
accommodate citizens’ concerns, ultimately preventing the Great Leap Famine. Eventually, the 
idea of mutual dependence between the state and the society could have prevented having a 
severe famine. 
China Today: Authoritarian government that listens 
Still authoritarian, the government of China now leads one of the largest economies in the 
world without experiencing substantial famine since the Great Leap Famine. What has changed 
from the Great Famine is that the CCP very responsive government which encourages limited 
freedom of expression. 43 Over the past few decades, the CCP tried to incorporate fair and 
accountable government with freedom of expression, implementing merit-based promotion, 
village level democracy, rule of law, protest permissions, and less censored media. Of course, 
these are not absolute freedom nor fairness because legitimacy of the CCP cannot be discussed 
and corruption is broadly evident. However, the CCP has certainly evolved to be much more 
adaptive to the significant challenges of the society than it was back in 1950s, and is now capable 
                                                     
43 Daniel A. Bell, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the limits of Democracy (Princeton; Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2015). 
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of even leading the global economy. Still authoritarian, Chinese government values free 
expression of ideas and responds to the society as in democracy by implementing these ideas. In 
short, not only independent and democratic with relatively free press as Sen suggested, but also 
any form of government which values exchange of thoughts and is willing to responds to the 
citizens can evade substantial famine. 
Conclusion 
 Some scholars argue that famines occurred in democratic countries such as Bangladesh in 
1974, Sudan in 1986-1988 and Ireland in 1945-1949. However, Burchi contends that 
“Bangladesh was democratic and liberal in name only and South Sudan and Ireland was not 
considered as parts of the United Kingdom respectively.”44 Although these countries may have 
appeared as democratic, they were oppressed by their governments.  
As Sen suggested, if China had independent and democratic government with relatively 
free press in 1950s, the Great Leap Famine could have been prevented. During the Great Leap 
Famine, Mao ignored political elites, silenced intellectuals, and was not informed about 
villagers’ concerns, ultimately resulting in the catastrophic famine with millions of casualties. 
The famine could have been prevented under the Sen’s conditions because democratic 
institutionalization allows political elites to freely discuss policies, freedom of expression 
encourages intellectuals to freely criticize scientific theories, and democratic election and mass 
media coverage motivates citizens to freely address their concerns. However, when looking at 
current Chinese government, not only democratic but also independent, fair, and accountable 
authoritarian government which encourages free exchange of ideas could evade substantial 
famine as well. 
                                                     
44 Francesco Burchi, “Democracy, institutions and famines in developing and emerging countries,” Canadian 
Journal of Development Studies 32, no.1 (2011): 22. 
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